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The 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education established that the segregation of 
public schools based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Across the United States, there was a spectrum of reactions to Brown. Responses ranged from 
optimism and celebration to anger and violence. This paper surveys the varied reception of Brown 
from politicians, parents, teachers, journalists, and other parties. It acknowledges the grayscale 
of opinions within and across demographic lines. The purpose of this paper is to recognize the 
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The landmark 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of 
Education did not simply reverse the precedent of “sepa-
rate but equal” concerning school segregation; it turned 
the infrastructure of society on its head. The Brown de-
cision was a civil rights triumph, but implementation 
created political tension and dissent across the nation. 
School desegregation e!orts that followed in the first 
years after the decision were met with aggressive re-
sistance from Southern states. O"cials demonstrated 
their disdain for the federal order through both pub-
lic political defiance and personal statements. With no 
clear plan or support from the federal government in 
its formative years, Brown led to uncertainty and strong 
initial reactions from individuals. 
The Brown decision was a civil 
rights triumph, but implementation 
created political tension and dissent
 across the nation. 
Often oversimplified into camps of “for” or “against” 
along racial divides, reactions to the Brown decision 
were more complex. Feelings varied on the individual 
level, with both African American and white individu-
als abandoning the dominant sentiments of their de-
mographic in regard to Brown and school integration. 
This paper surveys contemporary newspaper editorials, 
opinion pieces, letters, and articles, along with more re-
cent scholarship and reflections, to represent the broad 
range of responses that Brown elicited. Evaluating 
Brown from multiple perspectives prevents the oversim-
plification of American history.1 
“Separate but Equal”
In response to the Reconstruction era after the Civil 
War, Southerners sought to create an infrastructure 
1 For a good overview of the civil rights movement, see Frederic O. Sargent, The Civ-
il Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders, 1955-1968 (Je!erson, NC: McFarland, 2004), and 
Michael Ezra and Peter C. Mancall, Civil Rights Movement: People and Perspectives (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009). To read more on the court case Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, consult Diane Telgen, Defining Moments: Brown v. Board of Education (Detroit, MI: 
Omnigraphics, 2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke”: The Supreme Court 
and School Integration, 1954-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Lynn W. Zim-
merman, “Reflections on Brown.” American Educational History Journal 33, no. 2 (2006): 
89-96, Education Research Complete; Raphael Cassimere Jr., “Remembering Brown vs. 
Board of Education,” The Crisis 101, no. 4 (1994): 10, 17-18, Education Research Complete; 
and Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of “Brown v. Board of Education” and Black 
America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). For further information 
on Massive Resistance, refer to Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New 
York: George Braziller Inc., 1973) and Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race 
and Politics in the South During the 1950’s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1969). For additional readings on Southern responses to this decision, see R. Ray Mc-
Cain, “Reactions to the United States Supreme Court Segregation Decision of 1954,” The 
Georgia Historical Quarterly 52, no. 4 (1968): 371-87, www.jstor.org/stable/40578897; James J. 
Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962); 
and Angie Maxwell, The Indicted South: Public Criticism, Southern Inferiority, and the Politics 
of Whiteness (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014). Finally, for a 
better understanding of contemporary sentiments regarding the case and its decision, 
refer to “Text of 96 Congressmen’s Declaration on Integration,” New York Times, March 
12, 1956, Proquest, and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the primary 
legal material of the case and decision.
that suppressed the rights of African Americans in 
their region. The statutes and de facto racism set in 
place during this period only continued to expand over 
the course of the early twentieth century, particularly 
after the Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
ruled that “separate but equal” was constitutional. As 
a result, segregation and Jim Crow laws permeated 
Southern American culture. The government approved 
of separating Americans based on their skin color, as 
long as each group was provided “equal” access to spac-
es and resources. This “separate but equal” decision en-
abled racism and segregation without constraint, from 
separate drinking fountains and local transportation to 
public schools and movie theaters.2
Following the end of World War II in 1945, African Amer-
icans began to call more adamantly for their rights and 
equal treatment by their state and federal governments. 
African American soldiers came home from serving on 
the front lines of the global war and, alongside civil-
ians, expressed their aversion to the mistreatment they 
experienced in their hometowns. Vocalization against 
a discriminatory system so deep-rooted in the hearts 
of many white Southerners created incredibly conten-
tious environments within Southern states. This ten-
sion between the two largest groups in the region led 
to both civil and violent conflicts as African Americans 
fought to be treated as equal to their white neighbors.3 
Through court cases in Delaware, 
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Washington, DC, during the 1940s 
and early 1950s, the NAACP fought 
for equality within segregated higher 
education.
African American activist organizations, such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP), and various grassroot groups 
worked to counter racism on both state and nation-
al levels through the judicial system. One of the most 
evident forms of mistreatment and disadvantage was 
the inequality of public schools. Through court cas-
es in Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Washington, DC, during the 1940s and early 1950s, the 
NAACP fought for equality within segregated higher 
education, such as law schools. Though the specifics of 
these “equalization suits” varied—some aimed for full 
integration of African American and white students 
(Delaware), while others aimed to secure better Afri-
can American schools which were equal in resources 
2 Waldo E. Martin Jr., “Brown v. Board of Education”: A Brief History with Documents (Bos-
ton: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 76-80.
3 Kluger, Simple Justice, 224-227.
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and facilities to white schools (Virginia and South Car-
olina)—all five cases sought school equality. Each case 
was unsuccessful in the lower courts, and was appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Since these cases did not 
achieve the change African American activist groups 
wanted, Baltimore lawyer Thurgood Marshall compiled 
extensive evidence from each case to fight segregation 
in public education. Marshall, the NAACP’s chief lawyer 
since 1938, had detailed where to bring up the initial 
suits, what schools should be desegregated, and who to 
file each suit against so that the case would be its stron-
gest when addressed by the federal judiciary.4
Legal Integration
Brown v. Board of Education first reached the Supreme 
Court in 1952, only two years after Marshall convinced 
the NAACP to challenge institutional segregation in 
public education. The Brown case brought a compila-
tion of the five di!erent cases about school segrega-
tion before the Supreme Court. All five cases shared 
the same argument: the “separate but equal” doctrine 
in Plessy v. Ferguson violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Initially, the case was 
sent back and forth between the state courts and Su-
preme Court, which made acquiring a court hearing a 
lengthy process. After much deliberation, the Supreme 
Court decided on June 9, 1952, that it would hear the 
five school segregation cases. The Court combined the 
cases into one trial set to begin in October 1952, which 
was later postponed to December to be heard with oth-
er school cases.5
All five cases shared the same 
argument: the “separate but equal” 
doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
The case was delivered with two distinct sides: pro-in-
tegration on the part of Thurgood Marshall and the 
NAACP versus anti-integration on the part of South 
Carolinian attorney John Davis. Marshall and the 
NAACP accused “separate but equal” of violating in-
dividual rights based on the Fourteenth Amendment, 
while Davis claimed schools separated by race served 
the needs of ill-educated African Americans and that 
the social experiment of integration would disadvan-
tage these students rather than benefit them. After the 
Brown case hearing ended, the Supreme Court Justices 
deliberated throughout 1953. Newly appointed Chief 
4 Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke,” 27.
5 James T. Patterson, “Brown v. Board of Education”: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled 
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21, 27.; Kluger, Simple Justice, 540.
Justice Earl Warren advanced his strong convictions in 
the deliberations that “separate but equal” created de 
jure inferiority of African Americans and was therefore 
unconstitutional.6
Following many conferences regarding the case, the 
Supreme Court released their decision on May 17, 1954. 
Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The opinion 
was brief given the complexity and significance of the 
case. Warren highlighted the importance of education 
to the development of every individual, and the nation 
holistically, by providing equal opportunity. He argued 
“to separate them [African American students] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because 
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority.”7 The Su-
preme Court called for the disbanding of the “separate 
but equal” doctrine in public education due to its viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. Desegregation was to begin in all state public 
education systems. Implementing this decision would 
fundamentally alter the infrastructure of school sys-
tems in over half of the United States, including the 
District of Columbia.
Initial Optimism
The implementation of Brown was seen as the beginning 
of movement toward equal rights for all citizens. Afri-
can American newspapers emphasized the popular sen-
timents of enthusiasm and hope in the weeks following 
the Court’s decision. In the Pittsburgh Courier, editorial-
ist George S. Schuyler wrote, “The whole atmosphere 
for acceptance of such a decision as the Supreme Court 
handed down the other day was slowly being created 
in the Jim-Crow areas. If it hadn’t existed, the Court 
would not have rendered the decision it did.”8 Schuyler 
had been criticized for voicing this belief prior to the 
Brown decision but was still not surprised by the out-
come. Other national leaders were quoted in the same 
May 29 issue of the Courier with positive views regard-
ing Brown. The National Association of Colored Women 
(NACW) president, Irene McCoy Haines, declared the 
decision to be “the greatest judicial finding in favor 
of the welfare of the Negro groups since the passage 
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments.”9 Hopeful and confident testimonies, such as 
these, were abundant in African American newspapers. 
6 Kluger, Simple Justice, 541; Juan Williams, “Thurgood Marshall and Brown v.. Board 
of Ed.,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, December 8, 2003, https://www.npr.
org/2003/12/08/thurgood-marshall-and-brown-v-board-of-ed; Patterson, “Brown v. Board 
of Education,” 64. 
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
8 George S Schuyler, “High Court Decision Was No Surprise to Him,” opinion, Pitts-
burgh Courier, May 29, 1954. 
9 “Nat’l Leaders Laud Ban on School Segregation: Supreme Court’s Decision Called 
‘Long Over Due,’” Pittsburgh Courier, May 29, 1954. 
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They articulated the popular opinion amongst the com-
munity, while also working to convince those who were 
wary about Brown’s impact on the nation.
Thurgood Marshall enforced these hopeful sentiments. 
When asked about Brown after his legal victory, Mar-
shall often expressed how implementation was inevita-
ble and would likely be swift, no matter the region. One 
October article from The Washington Post and Times Her-
ald best displays Marshall’s optimism about the future 
of school integration: “If they can desegregate schools 
in Baltimore, they can desegregate schools anywhere, 
including Biloxi, [Mississippi].”10 
A month later in the same newspaper, Marshall respond-
ed to news that Southern states were moving to estab-
lish private schools: “I don’t believe people would be 
able to abolish school systems they have spent 70 or 80 
years building up.”11 Marshall was certain these South-
ern threats to establish private schools were empty and 
believed that people would not go through unnecessary 
trouble to evade the inevitability of integration. Mar-
shall’s initial confidence in public school integration’s 
success was unwavering, but he did not realize the defi-
ance Brown would face in the coming years.
The NAACP realized that legal success 
did not translate to triumph over the 
larger issue of racism that plagued 
American society.
The initial elation expressed by Marshall, the NAACP, 
and African American newspapers waned as they eval-
uated the logistics of this legal decision. In the first 
month following the Brown decision, the NAACP real-
ized that legal success did not translate to triumph over 
the larger issue of racism that plagued American soci-
ety. The June-July issue of their magazine, The Crisis, 
was dedicated almost entirely to Brown and expressed 
this awareness. In the editorial section of the issue, one 
author wrote, “We also feel it necessary to temper our 
exultation with the warning that this is a major bat-
tle won, not a campaign concluded.” They added that 
having “unintelligent optimism and childish faith in 
a court decision can blind us to the fact that legal ab-
olition of segregation is not the final solution for the 
social cancer of racism.”12 This editorial communicated 
the NAACP’s optimism, but also acknowledged the fight 
10 “NAACP Encouraged, Virginians Are Told,” Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-
1959), October 12, 1954, Proquest.
11 “Integration Foes Seen Facing Suit,” Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959), No-
vember 29, 1954, Proquest. 
12 “Segregation Decision,” editorial, The Crisis, June-July 1954, 352, https://books.
google.com/books?id=9VcEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summa-
ry_r&cad=o#v=onepage&q&f=false.
for equality being far from over. They recognized the 
opposition from Southerners who believed their state 
rights and cultural customs were threatened by Brown, 
but nonetheless planned to continue their pursuit of 
school integration across the United States.
Compliance with Integration
Many states believed in the inevitability of this court 
decision and agreed to implement integration as out-
lined in Brown. As Missouri State Attorney General John 
Montgomery Dalton put forth in a ten-page statement 
a month after the Brown decision: “It is the opinion of 
this o"ce that the provisions of the Missouri Constitu-
tion and Statutes relating to separate schools ‘for white 
children and colored children’ are superseded by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and 
are, therefore, unenforceable.” With this statement, 
Dalton confirmed the plan of Missouri, a border state, 
to move forward with integration, a position that con-
trasted from the Deep South.13
Accordingly, the majority of communities in Missouri 
planned to integrate their schools by September 1955. 
The reason for this pro-integration stance was because 
state o"cials saw benefits in the desegregation ruling. 
Funding the dual education system was a financial bur-
den on the state and abolishing the system would con-
siderably relieve the state budget. The closing of seg-
regated schools was not perfect though. As part of the 
cost savings, Missouri reduced the number of teaching 
positions throughout the state. In Moberly, Missouri, 
fifteen teaching contracts were not renewed, with elev-
en African Americans denied their positions. This case 
displayed how inequality was a deeper-rooted and more 
widespread issue in America than the general popula-
tion was led to believe.14 
Despite common anti-integration sentiments, some 
Southern and border state o"cials admitted to the 
decision’s inevitability and spoke in favor of gradual 
implementation beginning at the local level. One such 
person was distinguished Richmond attorney and Pu-
litzer Prize winner, David John Mays, who detailed in 
his personal diary: “I am satisfied of the following: (1) 
integration is certain to come; (2) Virginia people will 
sacrifice their public school system, even today, to pre-
vent integration; and (3) ultimately we must cushion 
the impact of integration at the local level, although 
under general statutes.” Mays’s concession showed how 
13 Peter William Moran, “Border State Ebb and Flow: School Desegregation in Missou-
ri, 1954-1999,” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing “Brown v. Board of Education,” eds. 
Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C Bolton (Fayetteville, University of Arkansas Press), 
179, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1!jjdp.12.
14 Moran, “Border State Ebb and Flow,” 180.
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not all white Southerners were aggressively fighting 
for segregation.15 
Intellectuals, newspaper editors, and ordinary citizens 
also voiced their views. One writer and social critic, 
Lillian Smith of Georgia, wrote to The New York Times: 
“Then why are a few politicians protesting so angrily? 
Perhaps because they feel they will now be handicapped 
if the old crutch of ‘race’ is snatched away from them.”16 
She expressed the resentment small pockets of South-
erners felt toward those who wanted to defy the fed-
eral government and perpetrate racism for their own 
agendas. Even individuals who would later oppose in-
tegration, such as Richmond News Leader editor James J. 
Kilpatrick, initially spoke of the Court’s decision neu-
trally. Kilpatrick wrote in an editorial: “To bring the two 
races together in the social intimacy of a classroom will 
not come easily to the South. .. .  However, if the court 
would consent to a more moderate program of inte-
gration, the prospect of preserving public education in 
the South would be immeasurably improved.” He spoke 
on the importance of preserving public education in 
Virginia and explained how the Brown decision should 
not cause a system of “tutors and private schools for 
the well-to-do, and illiteracy for everyone else.”17 These 
statements echoed the feelings of other white conser-
vatives, who believed change should happen eventually, 
but not in the form presented by the Court.
Amongst the reactions of white Southerners, many of 
Virginia’s political and educational leaders were more 
concerned about Brown’s long-term impact than the 
often-described “immediate” anger. Bitterness was 
one popular sentiment, as many believed the Supreme 
Court infringed on the conventions of the South. Col-
lege students at the University of Virginia claimed this 
bitterness was justified; an excerpt from a 1954 edito-
rial in the University of Virginia Cavalier Daily read, “It 
is hard from a strict legal point of view to justify any 
action contrary to law,” displaying wariness and annoy-
ance more than an outright defiance of Brown.18 Addi-
tionally, some Virginia government o"cials voiced a va-
riety of responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling. State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Dowell J. Howard 
and State Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond Jr. both 
expressed their apprehension regarding the decision 
and its implementation, but also expressed their belief 
that Virginia would be compliant with the new federal 
15 David John Mays, Race, Reason, and Massive Resistance: The Diary of David J. Mays, 1954-
1959, ed. James R. Sweeney (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 36.
16 Lillian Smith, “Ruling on Schools Hailed,” letter to the editor, New York Times, May 
31, 1954, Proquest.
17 James J. Kilpatrick, “The Decision,” editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 18, 1954. 
18 “‘Violates’ Way of Life,” Cavalier Daily, May 18, 1954, quoted in Martin Jr., “Brown v. 
Board of Education,” 206-207. 
standard. As Almond Jr. stated, “The highest court in 
the land has spoken and I trust that Virginia will ap-
proach the question realistically and endeavor to work 
out some rational adjustment.”19
Parents and Teachers’ Unease 
Though African Americans acknowledged the good 
intentions of the Brown decision, many teachers and 
parents were unsure whether the Supreme Court was 
introducing the right course of action when it came to 
African Americans attaining equal rights. The equaliza-
tion suits which preceded Brown aimed to protect and 
improve the resources and facilities already available to 
African American students and teachers. These cases 
intended to find a middle ground of progress which was 
palatable to a larger portion of the public. Since the out-
comes of these cases hardly succeeded in the ways those 
who filed had hoped for—the results they sought either 
succeeded with partial equality or were wholly denied 
by the courts—Brown aimed to overhaul this separat-
ed system. Brown called for no equalization of di!erent 
school systems, but for the integration of students into 
unified school systems. Brown introduced a new hope 
for progress, but it failed to consider the inequalities 
integration could create for African American students 
and teachers. Overturning America’s deep-rooted cul-
tural and social racism would take more e!ort than one 
legal victory could achieve.
Overturning America’s deep-rooted 
cultural and social racism would 
take more e!ort than one legal 
victory could achieve.
In Prince Edward County, Virginia, African American 
parents watched legislators withhold funds for public 
schools while elitist white-only private schools were es-
tablished to prevent integration. In the state of Florida, 
African Americans could not see the reality of Brown’s 
proposed “fixes” for equal rights. Some wanted to focus 
on equalization, or the equal distribution of resourc-
es between African American and white schools, which 
was already occurring in some Southern states, rather 
than uproot an entire infrastructure the population 
knew and accepted. As Judge Constance Baker Motley 
recounted, “They [the NAACP] brought a number of 
cases seeking to equalize the salaries of Black teach-
ers. They also brought cases which were directed at the 
graduate school level because no separate facility had 
been provided for Blacks at that level.” Motley explained 
19 Quoted in Benjamin Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1961), 5.
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how the NAACP expected resistance, but nowhere near 
the sophisticated or extensive lengths actually taken by 
the opposition.20
Parents worried about the safety of their children and 
advocated for maintaining segregation. Thus far, their 
children had associated with those who were like them, 
which was not the case when school integration started. 
Additionally, some argued that maintaining segregated 
public schools would keep violent and cruel resistance 
e!orts at bay. As The Chicago Defender noted in a 1957 ar-
ticle, “[The] Negro proportion of school enrollment in 
Southern and border states has declined in ten states 
and increased in seven states and the District of Colum-
bia in five years since the original school segregation 
cases went to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Parents’ caution 
with the system of integration and its dangers led to 
large groups of African Americans fleeing to the North, 
where they believed they would experience less hostil-
ity and condemnation that many Southern whites har-
bored during this time period.21 
Parents opted to send their children to other school 
districts when their local schools closed. As one Prince 
Edward County father, Phillip Ward, explained to his 
daughter, “the whites don’t want Black kids to be with 
their kids. They feel you’re below them.”22 Ward’s words 
conveyed the reality many Southern African Amer-
icans faced, a reality that had been their worry since 
the Brown decision. Though parents were defeated and 
unhappy about the lack of substantial enforcement for 
school integration, they were nonetheless determined 
to see their children receive a proper education.
The dangers of integration African American parents 
worried about were not always as civil as school closures; 
one event demonstrated that violence was a real threat 
facing African Americans seeking to integrate. In 1958, 
Clinton High School in Clinton, Tennessee, was bombed 
with dynamite after the state of Tennessee implement-
ed integration on a local option basis. Integration in 
Clinton first occurred during the 1956-1957 school year. 
By the second day of classes, there were already threats 
of violence. The National Guard was called to keep the 
peace for the following two weeks. This temporary alle-
viation did not cease acts of violence and intimidation; 
shots were fired, and dynamite was thrown into Afri-
20 Constance Baker Motley, “Eyes on the Prize; Interview with Constance Baker 
Motley,” interview by Judith Vecchione, American Archive of Public Broadcasting, Li-
brary of Congress and WGBH, March 8, 1986, https://americanarchive.org/catalog/
cpb-aacip_151-zg6g15vcor.
21 “Percentage of Negro Pupils Drops in Dixie: Increases in Washington, D.C.,”#The 
Chicago Defender, December 14, 1957, Proquest.
22 Betty Jean Ward (African American Prince Edward County student) recounts a talk 
with her father, in Kristen Green, Something Must Be Done About Prince Edward County: A 
Family, a Virginia Town, a Civil Rights Battle, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2015), 149.
can American communities. The principal of Clinton 
High School even faced bomb threats by angry white 
townspeople. This tension over integration came to a 
breaking point when the school was bombed one night 
in October, 1958. Three separate explosions obliterated 
the interior of the school, causing damage which led 
the local newspaper publisher to predict that “it would 
be quite a while before classes can be resumed at the 
school.”23 A statement released by Clinton Police Chief 
Francis Moore explained how there was “no doubt 
that this dynamiting is connected with integration of 
the school.”24 Despite two years of integration, white 
Southerners still performed extreme measures to ex-
press their opposition. Clinton High School’s bombing, 
and other instances that paralleled it, made national 
news and further heightened the worries of African 
American parents.
Many African American teachers were 
dismissed from their jobs because 
white teachers were given priority in the 
integrated school market. 
African American teachers also experienced anxiety 
in light of their diminishing job opportunities as a re-
sult of Brown. When schools were segregated, African 
American teachers regularly had the ability to teach at 
the schools of their own race, since the teaching pro-
fession was segregated for teachers as much as it was 
for students. Brown did not make any claims for the de-
segregation of teachers as schools integrated with one 
another. As a result, many African American teachers 
were dismissed from their jobs because white teachers 
were given priority in the integrated school market. 
Written only days after the passing of Brown, one Chica-
go Defender article noted that “O"cials of several states 
have said they would not employ Negro teachers in inte-
grated schools.” At Athens College in Alabama, the ad-
ministration team bluntly denied the possibility of ever 
hiring African American teachers. The Crisis included 
a letter from the registrar of the college to the youth 
secretary of the NAACP in its June 1954 issue in which 
the registrar went so far as to proclaim “We will proba-
bly never hire any of them [African American teachers]. 
Your northers [sic] ‘Yankee’ friends will employ them. 
Not us…. Don’t insult us any more with such expecta-
tions.” Implementing widespread desegregation was 
only required at the student level, leaving many African 
American teachers vulnerable. Due to this lack of feder-
al integration orders at the faculty level, African Ameri-
can teachers were stripped of any hope for job security, 
23 “High School at Clinton Dynamited: Tennessee O!ers Reward of $5000; FBI Joins 
Inquiry,” Washington Post and Times Herald, October 6, 1958, Proquest.
24 “High School at Clinton Dynamited.”
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leaving many bitter. Some African American teachers 
did not want desegregation to take place because it cost 
them career opportunities and created a new system of 
exclusivity based upon de facto racism.25
Opposition to Integration
One of the most prominent African Americans who 
spoke in opposition to the Brown decision was Zora Ne-
ale Hurston. Hurston was a Southern anthropologist, 
folklorist, and writer who showed no support for de-
segregation. Her views demonstrated a stark contrast 
to the dominant opinion of African Americans at the 
time; she was a fervent supporter of institutions sep-
arated by race. Hurston believed separate institutions 
preserved and promoted racial pride. She argued that 
desegregated schools put African American children 
in the position to feel inferior to their white peers 
and have to face this inferiority complex head-on. In a 
letter to the editor of a Florida paper, Hurston wrote, 
“How much satisfaction can I get from a court order 
for somebody to associate with me who does not wish 
me near them?” Hurston expressed her sentiments: “I 
regard the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court as insult-
ing rather than honoring my race.” Unlike many Afri-
can Americans who reacted to the Brown decision with 
hopeful wariness, Hurston stated her contempt openly 
and called for others to express their frustrations. She 
believed there was no need for sympathy or respect 
for those who saw race as a “tragedy of color.” Hurston 
believed those who shared these opinions overlooked 
the possible benefits of segregated education and that 
groups rallying in support of Brown did not consider all 
the factors and e!ects of the Supreme Court’s decision 
before pressuring others to support it. She continued 
her support for segregated education and her prefer-
ence for equalization by explaining, “Negro schools in 
the state are in very good shape and on the improve.” 
In Hurston’s eyes, equalization and gradualism proved a 
more promising movement toward equal rights for Af-
rican Americans than forced progress.26
Massive Resistance
Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd’s immediate response 
represents the intense backlash and criticism surround-
ing Brown. He argued it was “the most serious blow that 
has been struck against the rights of the states in a 
matter vitally a!ecting their authority and welfare.”27 
25 Darrell Garwood, “Kill Jim Crow Schools: U.S. Supreme Court Rules Unanimously 
in Ending Segregation in Education,”#The Chicago Defender,#May 22, 1954, Proquest; F. D. 
Ward, letter to Herbert L. Wright, 2 June 1954, The Crisis, June-July 1954, 336.
26 Zora Neale Hurston, “Court Order Can’t Make Races Mix,” letter to the editor, 
Orlando Sentinel, The Public Thought, August 11, 1955, quoted in Martin Jr., “Brown v. Board 
of Education,” 209-212.
27 For a biography of Harry F. Byrd, see Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia 
Byrd believed the Supreme Court’s decision for school 
integration was outside the federal government’s juris-
diction and scope, and he reacted defiantly when other 
state o"cials suggested compliance to Brown. As head 
of Virginia’s Democratic Party machine, Byrd rallied 
support against integration throughout the state. Byrd 
did not conduct his agenda publicly, however, but gath-
ered support behind the scenes through persuasion of 
other Virginia government o"cials, such as Governor 
Thomas B. Stanley.28 
Byrd used his political prowess, 
knowledge of loophole manipulation, 
and persuasive speech to change minds 
from compliance to resistance.
Byrd used his political prowess, knowledge of loophole 
manipulation, and persuasive speech to change minds 
from compliance to resistance. He began by working 
with his Southern colleagues in the District of Colum-
bia to prepare for an all-Southern resistance gesture. 
He also supported the idea of interposition, in which a 
state had a right to “interpose its sovereignty” between 
its citizens and the federal government. In these subtle 
ways, Byrd persuaded other Virginia and Southern o"-
cials. Governor Thomas B. Stanley’s change of heart was 
most evident, as he initially accepted the Brown decision 
in May 1954, but within two short months threatened to 
use all of his power to continue segregated schools in 
Virginia. By September 1954, Stanley called for a board, 
known as the Gray Commission,29 to discuss Brown and 
determine the best course of action to resist its imple-
mentation. Stanley’s stance completely changed, as his 
original words—“I am confident the people of Virginia 
will receive the opinion of the Supreme Court calmly 
and take time to carefully dispassionately consider the 
situation before coming to conclusions on steps which 
should be taken”—became null at the hands of Byrd’s 
influence. Byrd’s puppeteering caught the attention of 
notable o"cials and gained momentum.30 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996).
28 “Governor to Call Meeting of State Leaders on School Problem: Stanley Sees No 
Need Now for Assembly Meeting,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954; Muse, Virgin-
ia’s Massive Resistance, 26; Brian J. Daugherity, “‘Keep on Keeping On’: African Americans 
and the Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia,” in With All Deliberate 
Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, eds. Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C. 
Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 43-44.
29 A commission appointed by Governor Thomas B. Stanley in August 1954. The pur-
pose of the Gray Commission was to investigate the e!ects of the Brown decision and 
to make implementation recommendations to the Virginia legislature. All members of 
the commission were white, male legislators from the Fourth District (Southside) of 
Virginia, where the state had its most concentrated African American populations. By 
November 1955, the Gray Commission provided its final report, where they o!ered the 
idea of a “local option,” which granted each locality in the state the right to process 
desegregation at its own speed, and recommended amending the Virginia State Consti-
tution, Section 141, to allow “tuition grants” to white parents for the private education 
of their children.
30 Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance, 22, 27; Brian J. Daugherity, “‘Keep on Keeping 
On,’” 44; “Governor to Call Meeting,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954. 
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Byrd encouraged his resistance agenda amongst other 
Southern representatives in DC more aggressively two 
years after the original Brown decision. Southern sena-
tors and representatives deliberated this agenda set in 
opposition to integration. On March 12, 1956, Georgia 
Senator Walter George introduced the infamous “Dec-
laration of Constitutional Principles,” which would lat-
er be known as the Southern Manifesto. The document 
made headlines as it publicly contested the federal gov-
ernment’s involvement and claimed, “This unwarrant-
ed exercise of power by the court, contrary to the Con-
stitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the states 
primarily a!ected.” Furthermore, the Brown decision 
was “destroying the amicable relations between white 
and Negro races that have been created through nine-
ty years of patient e!ort by the good people of both 
races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where there 
has been heretofore friendship and understanding.” 
This declaration exhibited the first strong example of 
Massive Resistance. The opposition movement would 
exist in the South for the next decade, especially after 
Brown II’s (1955) “all deliberate speed” ruling,31 which 
made integration di"cult for the federal government 
to enforce. Massive Resistance was a strategic move-
ment that utilized state legislation to prevent school 
integration by passing laws and policies in opposition. 
Byrd endorsed its development and publication along 
with Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who 
wrote the early drafts of the Southern Manifesto. Thus, 
Byrd secured his place as the founder of the Massive 
Resistance movement that would permeate the South.32
Massive Resistance was a strategic 
movement that utilized state legislation 
to prevent school integration by passing 
laws and policies in opposition.
While his “behind closed doors” and “o"cial” proceed-
ings occurred amidst other Southern representatives, 
Byrd continued to rally support for resistance in his 
home state of Virginia. On July 2, 1956, he called Gov-
ernor Stanley, State Senator Garland Gray, and other 
reliable leaders of his political organization for a secret 
conference to discuss the necessary action for defiance. 
During the meeting, Byrd convinced these o"cials to 
charge full speed ahead in their anti-integration e!orts 
through legislative measures. He also convinced Stan-
31 “With all deliberate speed” was a portion of the Brown II ruling which allowed local 
school boards to integrate African American and white students at a pace they deemed 
appropriate. This vague phrase enabled many Southern states to slow down, and even 
halt, any progress of the original Brown decision. Though this phrase was intended by 
the Supreme Court to soften the blow of inevitable integration, it resulted in greater 
resistance by states. 
32 Wilhoit, Politics of Massive Resistance, 51-53; “96 Congressmen’s Declaration on Inte-
gration” New York Times, 12 March 1956.
ley to hold a special session to discuss Virginia’s plan of 
resistance. In compliance with this suggestion, Stanley 
called for a special legislative session of the Virginia 
General Assembly on August 27, 1956. The session was 
held in Richmond and lasted twenty-seven days. During 
this time, they passed twenty-three acts regarding the 
school segregation issue. Passing these acts began the 
legislative crusade of Massive Resistance in Virginia. 
Though the legislators claimed the concept of “local 
option” was in practice, schools that opted for integra-
tion would be promptly “closed and removed from the 
public-school system.”33
Spread of Massive Resistance 
Virginia’s resistance created a path for other states, 
such as Georgia, to follow. Prior to Brown, Georgia was 
in the process of making plans for state school equal-
ization, regardless of the resistance within the state. 
Many white Georgians maintained similar sentiments 
and agendas as their Deep South and Virginia counter-
parts, with varying expressions of defiance and resis-
tance. To ensure the legal nullification of the Brown de-
cision, Georgia government o"cials created a proposal 
that provided educational vouchers to students via the 
state and local governments. The vouchers would sep-
arate children of di!erent races without technically 
constituting “discrimination;” this proposal became 
known as the “private school plan.” It received backlash 
nationwide by both whites and African Americans once 
it passed as an amendment to the state’s constitution. 
This new amendment provided the Georgia state legis-
lature with a green light to propose and pass more an-
ti-integration laws, under the condition that these laws 
would not pose legal challenges or explicitly contradict 
the federal ruling. The resulting laws and other legisla-
tion passed in Georgia, such as the ability to close public 
schools that were federally ordered to desegregate, be-
came part of the Massive Resistance movement as other 
Southern states followed these procedures. As long as 
school segregation fit within the legal jurisdiction of 
states, integration would be resisted with “all deliber-
ate speed.” The “private school plan” amendment dis-
played Southern segregationists’ determination to pre-
serve an institution teeming with discrimination and 
ignorance.34
Segregationists did not exist solely in the Southern 
states. Former border states, such as Delaware, em-
ployed considerable resistance against school integra-
33 Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance, 28-31. 
34 Thomas V. O’Brien, “Defiance, Protest, and Compromise: The Struggle to Imple-
ment Brown in Georgia, 1950-1973,” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. 
Board of Education, eds. Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton (Fayetteville: Univer-
sity of Arkansas Press, 2008), 95-96.
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tion. Many Delaware citizens held Southern-minded 
and traditionalist views pertaining to segregation, de-
spite a small African American population. When there 
was a shortage of funding for higher education, Del-
aware o"cials proposed integrating Delaware State 
College, a historically African American college, and 
the University of Delaware, a historically white institu-
tion; both African American and white citizens of the 
state opposed the plan. Though some school districts 
were integrated, which received praise from northern 
neighbors, the Brown decision incited cruel and hateful 
opposition in other communities in the state, such as 
Milford in the fall of 1954. When school began in Sep-
tember, the formerly white high school in Milford ad-
mitted eleven African American students for the school 
year. By September 20, the local government closed all 
Milford schools indefinitely in an act of resistance. One 
week later, Milford High School reopened. State and lo-
cal police were present as protestors threatened white 
and African American students alike for attending class. 
Some groups, such as the National Association for the 
Advancement of White People (NAAWP), went so far in 
their hate crimes as to hand out sheets of hateful mes-
sages, call and threaten African American parents for 
sending their children to a formerly white-only school, 
and scratch the names of the Milford Eleven from en-
rollment records. The “Milford Incident,” as it was com-
monly referred to, showcased how Massive Resistance 
became practiced in multiple states within the turn of 
a year.35 This incident exemplifies the direct opposition 
over the outcome of Brown. 
Conclusion
The Brown decision caused an uproar across the Unit-
ed States. Integration would not be fully implemented 
until an entire decade after the Supreme Court’s ini-
tial decision. The Massive Resistance movement main-
tained a steady prominence during this time, as many 
states continued to defy the federal government’s juris-
diction. Brown challenged the infrastructure of South-
ern society, which was based on Jim Crow laws and insti-
tutional segregation to maintain the “inferior” status 
of African Americans. Though this landmark case was 
a great victory for the American civil rights movement 
in the 1950s and 1960s and the advancement of equality 
among all citizens, its ambiguity and brevity helped lit-
tle in the guidance of racial issues and proper means of 
desegregating public schools. 
Brown served as a catalyst for cultural and legislative 
35 Bradley Skelcher, “Promises of Brown: Desegregating Education in Delaware, 1950-
1968” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, eds. Brian J. 
Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 155-
161; June Shagalo!, “Desegregation of Public Schools in Delaware,” The Journal of Negro 
Education 24, no. 3 (1955): 197-198, https://doi.org/10.2307/2293451.
change. The decision a!ected every American, provid-
ing a broad spectrum of emotional sentiments regard-
ing its ruling. Many people on both sides believed the 
decision was merely a “cultural shock” and “quick fix” 
to a larger and more deeply embedded social problem 
in America. The acceptance or defiance of Brown, and 
of the larger civil rights movement, was not a position 
taken by groups wholly as Americans are often taught. 
This distorted narrative too broadly simplifies an event 
and movement which called each American to reflect on 
their personal values and what is meant by the idea of 
equality.36 
36 Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke,” 48-49.
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